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Abstract
This paper proposes an asset allocation strategy for the risk management of
the broad category of participating life insurance policies. The nature of the
liability implied by these contracts allows us to treat them as options written on
the reference portfolio backing the policy; consequently, the valuation approach
is based on classical contingent claim theory. This leads to the identification of
additional safety loadings against the risk of default implied by these contracts,
and the setting up of suitable investment strategies aimed at minimizing this
risk. The impact on the solvency requirements for the capital of the insurer
of the proposed asset allocation strategy is analyzed by means of Monte Carlo
techniques. Stress testing is considered as well with respect to the key risk
factors of the model, such as the equity volatility and the market interest rate.
The numerical analysis shows that, for the specific policy design considered in
this paper, a suitable choice of the participation rate combined with the proposed
investment strategy minimizes the overall default risk of the insurance company,
both in terms of probability of default and expected severity.
Keywords: asset allocation, fair valuation, Monte Carlo methods, participat-
ing contracts, solvency requirements, TVaR.
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1 Introduction
Participating contracts now comprise an important part of the life insurance markets
of many countries, including the main developed economies in Europe, North America,
Asia and Australasia. The history of these contracts can be traced back to the with
profit policies offered by the Equitable Life in the UK in the early 1800s. The contracts
now appear in many manifestations with a wide range of guarantees, options and
ancillary benefit features included in the contract design. Correspondingly, they are
subject to many risks (e.g. interest rates, financial markets, default and mortality) and
so the modelling, valuation, pricing and risk management of participating life insurance
contracts have become important subjects for investigation and analysis.
In recent years, there has been a growing literature which has addressed the ap-
plication of fair valuation, using classical contingent claims theory, to participating
life insurance contracts. This literature followed the pioneering work of Brennan and
Schwartz (1976) on equity-linked life insurance and the extensions considered by the
work of Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997) to participating life insurance. One of the
most recent contributions building on Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997) is Ballotta
et al. (2006.b) in which a simple Black-Scholes economy with constant interest rates
is used to analyze the fair design of participating contracts in the case of a very gen-
eral structure, which includes a minimum guarantee, a scheme for the distribution of
the annual profit of the insurance company, a terminal bonus, the so-called default
option and shareholders’contribution. Amongst some of the other most recent works
on modelling and pricing for this class of contracts, we would also cite Bacinello (2001,
2003), who focuses in particular on the valuation of the surrender option in a discrete
time framework by means of the CRR model (Cox et al., 1979); Grosen and Jørgensen
(2000, 2002) and Bernard et al. (2005) who, instead, focus on the modelling of early
default of the insurance company in an extended Black-Scholes economy. Further ex-
tensions aimed at including market shocks have been analyzed by Ballotta (2005) and
Kassberger et al. (2008), whilst Ballotta (2009) focuses in particular on the impact of
model misspecification on the capital requirements of the insurer.
This trend in the literature has been given added strength in the last few years
by the development of new internationally accepted accounting standards, such as
for example the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 4, which have
placed an emphasis on “fair value” as a key concept. In this respect, Ballotta et al.
(2006.a) offer a review of the fair value based accounting framework promoted by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Insurance Project, with particular
emphasis on the model and parameter errors; they also provide a comparison between
the fair value principle and standard deterministic reserving methods. An additional
aspect of this paper is the treatment which the authors propose for the so-called default
option. Following the contributions of Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997), Ballotta et
al. (2006.a) identify the risk of default implied by the participating contract considered
in their paper, quantify it via the premium of the default option, and consider it as the
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price of transferring the contract’s default risk externally (if the insurance company
had been given this possibility). Hence, Ballotta et al. (2006.a) use the premium of
this embedded option to calculate a suitable solvency (or safety) loading to the initial
premium, based on the principle that, by charging this amount to the policyholder, the
insurer would ensure that the participating contract is issued at fair value, i.e. at a no-
arbitrage price. This paper also addresses the issue of how this default option premium
could be used by the insurance company for hedging and risk management purposes by
considering the very simple case of reinvesting this premium in the portfolio backing
the policy.
Hedging and reserving for participating contracts with minimum guarantee, though,
have been explored with particular attention for example by Consiglio et al. (2006) and
Bernard et al. (2006). In particular, Consiglio et al. (2006) consider the problem for an
insurance company of structuring the portfolio underlying their with profit contracts,
by means of non linear programming with stochastic variables generated by the Wilkie
(1995) asset model. Bernard et al. (2006) instead adopt a model set a´ la Merton (1974)
and develop three possible types of protection for the liability generated by this type of
contract based on the premium for the default option. In particular, these protection
types consist respectively of an increase in the assets backing the liabilities (as in
Ballotta et al., 2006.a), Equity Default Swaps, and a synthetic put option representing
the potential loss that the policyholders would suffer in the case of default of the
insurance company.
Following this latter stream of contributions, the aim of this paper is to consider
issues connected with the risk management of participating contracts by analysing the
choice of a suitable allocation strategy for the insurance company’s assets. In particular,
our approach is to consider a common policy design used in the UK for accumulating
(or unitized) with profits contracts; this particular policy design incorporates both re-
versionary and terminal type bonus elements, and hence it differs (in terms of both
detail and complexity) from that considered by other authors. The contract design is
also common in other European countries and Japan. We apply classical contingent
claims theory for its valuation, which allows us to identify the appropriate safety load-
ing; in this sense, the paper follows on from Ballotta et al (2006.b) in terms of choice
of the contract design and identification of the corresponding embedded options. We
then set up an asset allocation strategy which is aimed at minimizing the risk induced
by the policy as measured by the volatility of the (guaranteed) reversionary compo-
nent. Further, we analyze the impact of the choice of asset allocation on probabilities
of default and capital requirements for solvency purposes, and test its robustness via
stress testing techniques.
The analysis carried out in this paper shows that the proposed asset allocation,
despite reducing the relevance of the default option premium for risk management pur-
poses, generates a probability of default over a 1-year time horizon which lies within
the boundaries proposed by the regulatory requirements of Solvency II, and, at the
same time, minimizes the corresponding expected loss. Finally, the numerical evidence
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presented in this paper reveals the existence of an optimal policy design which mini-
mizes the overall default risk of the company (with respect to the given asset allocation
strategy) even under extreme market conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader to the participat-
ing contract considered in this paper, the identification of the embedded options, the
market model adopted for this study and the valuation procedure. Section 3 sets out
the principles underpinning the asset allocation proposed in this paper. The results
of the numerical experiments are presented in section 4, whereas section 5 is devoted
to the analysis of the stress testing procedure. Section 6 provides some concluding
comments.
2 Participating contracts with a minimum guaran-
tee
Consider a participating contract initiated at time t = 0 with the payment of a single
premium π(0). Under the terms of the policy, the insurer invests the premium in a
fund, F , in the financial market together with the capital provided by the shareholders,
E(0). In particular, we assume that π(0) = θF (0) and E(0) = (1−θ)F (0), where F (0)
is the initial value of the reference fund and θ is the cost allocation parameter, in the
sense that θ governs the distribution of the financial risk between the policyholders
and the shareholders, and therefore determines the size of the debt in the company’s
balance sheet (in this respect, Ballotta et al. (2006.b) regard θ as a leverage coefficient).
Finally, the insurer credits interest on the policy’s account balance until the contract
expires; the accumulated benefit is then payable if the policyholder dies during the
policy term of T years, or (at maturity) after T years. In either event, the account is
settled by a single payment from the insurer to the policyholder, unless the policyholder
is entitled to terminate the contract at his/her discretion prior to expiration, through
the so-called surrender option.
The single benefit payment is formed by a guaranteed component, π, which is
represented by the terminal value of the policy’s account balance, and a discretionary
bonus, R. The design of the guaranteed component generally includes a minimum
guaranteed annual rate, rG, and a participation in the surplus earned by the insurance
company. The exact specification varies from country to country. In this study, we
focus on the case of a typical UK accumulating (unitized) with profit contract, so that
π includes a regular periodic reversionary bonus reflecting the individual policyholder’s
shares of the company’s profit. As noted by Booth et al. (2005), most participating
life insurance contracts in the UK are now of the accumulating with profit type.
As the liability implied by these contracts is linked to the investment profile of the
insurer, the sources of risk associated with this type of contract include the risk from
the financial markets, from surrenders and from mortality. In this analysis, we focus
only on the first type of risk and we ignore both the possibility that the policyholder
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sells back the contract to the insurer (the surrender option) and mortality, recognizing
that these are both areas in which the analysis may be extended.
In the following sections, we introduce the features of the benefit paid by the par-
ticipating contract considered in this paper, with particular focus on the identification
of all the options embedded in the contract design, and their impact on the solvency
profile of the insurance company. In particular, we adopt the same set up as in Ballotta
et al. (2006.b).
2.1 Contract design
We assume that at the beginning of each period over the lifetime of the contract, the
policy reserve, π, accumulates at rate rπ so that{
π (t) = π (t− 1) (1 + rπ (t)) t = 1, 2, ..., T
π (0) = θF (0) .
(1)
The rate rπ incorporates the minimum annual guaranteed rate, rG, and the rever-
sionary bonus rate. Our detailed assumption is that the scheme for the distribution of
the returns earned by the reference fund is based on the arithmetic average of the last
τ period returns on the reference portfolio, so that
rπ (t) = max
{
rG,
β
n
(
F (t)
F (t− 1)
+ ... +
F (t− n+ 1)
F (t− n)
− n
)}
= rG +
(
β
n
n∑
i=1
F (i)
F (i− 1)
− (β + rG)
)+
, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the participating rate and n is the length of the smoothing
period chosen as n = min (t, τ).
Thus, the annual credited interest rate depends on a smoothed percentage of the
annual returns generated by the reference fund. Insurance companies in the UK also use
alternative smoothing schemes for the building up of the benefits, with the reversionary
bonus based, for example, on the geometric average of the last τ period returns on the
reference portfolio, or on the principle of the “smoothed asset share” (see, for example,
Chadburn (1998) and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (2001)).
It is clear from equation (2) that, on the one hand, the benefit π is guaranteed
never to fall below the contractually specified rate rG, offering in this way a downside
protection to the policyholder. On the other hand, the benefit π also incorporates a
sequence of Asian call options on the fund’s returns, which affect the risk profile of the
insurer’s liabilities and, therefore, require particular attention in terms of pricing and
reserving.
As mentioned above, at the maturity of the contract, T , the policyholder receives
the terminal value of the policy reserve and any surplus generated by the reference
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portfolio in excess of the benefit in respect of his/her contribution to the assets of the
insurance company. Hence, the full terminal payoff of the contract is
B(T ) = π (T ) + γR (T ) ,
where
R (T ) = (θF (T )− π (T ))+ (3)
denotes the payoff of the terminal bonus, and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a second participation
parameter. We note the distinction between the two participation parameters, whereby
β affects the annual credited rate rπ (t) , whereas γ only operates at maturity (or on
earlier death). The terminal bonus is, therefore, a European call option on the reference
portfolio, capturing the fact that the policyholders do not contribute to possible deficits
of the insurance company. We also note that this call option has exotic features due
to the floating nature of the strike price.
From equations (1) and (3), it follows that
π (T ) = θF (0)
T∏
t=1
(1 + rπ (t)) = θπ
u (T ) ,
R (T ) = (θF (T )− π (T ))+ = θRu (T ) ,
where πu (T ) and Ru (T ) denote respectively the value at maturity of the policy reserve
and the terminal bonus in the case in which the insurance company is “fully sponsored”
by policyholders (i.e. θ = 1). This implies that, in absence of default, the overall benefit
function is
B (T ) = θ (πu (T ) + γRu (T )) . (4)
2.2 Default risk and solvency loading
Equation (4) describes the overall benefit which the policyholder is entitled to receive at
maturity if the company is solvent, i.e. if the insurer’s assets are enough to provide the
payment of the guaranteed benefit π. If default occurs, instead, and the equityholders
have limited liability, the policyholder takes those assets that are available. Under
the assumption that default can only occur at maturity, the liability implied by the
participating contract for the insurance company is

F (T ) if F (T ) < π (T )
π (T ) if π (T ) ≤ F (T ) < π(T )
θ
B (T ) if F (T ) ≥ π(T )
θ
,
(5)
or, in a more compact way,
B (T )−D (T ) , (6)
where
D (T ) = (π (T )− F (T ))+
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represents the potential default of the insurance company. As already noted, in this
framework, default can only occur at maturity; in practice, though, the regulators
monitor the solvency of insurance companies on a regular basis over time (for example,
through an annual analysis of statistical data and financial statements). Grosen and
Jørgensen (2002) and Bernard et al. (2005) show how to extend the pricing framework
in order to incorporate early default. In this paper, we do not explore this issue any
further but we refer the interested reader to the above mentioned references.
The balance sheet equation implies that the overall equityholders’ claim can be
expressed as
F (T )−B (T ) +D (T ) .
If we denote by V· (0) the market consistent value of each contract component, then
the market consistent value of the policyholder’s and equityholders’ payoff at maturity
can be rewritten as{
π (0) = θ [Vπu (0) + γVRu (0)]− VD(0),
E (0) = F (0)− θ [Vπu (0) + γVRu (0)] + VD(0).
Further, we note that, since E (0) = (1− θ)F (0), the fair value equation for the equi-
tyholder is the same as the one for the policyholder, i.e. for no arbitrage opportunities
to rise in the market, we require that
π (0) = θ [Vπu (0) + γVRu (0)]− VD(0). (7)
Equation (7) provides the market consistent value of the contract considered in this
analysis, in the sense that it returns the fair price at which the policy could be traded
in an arbitrage-free market. We note, however, that since participating contracts are
not fully tradeable in the market, as there is no secondary market for these policies,
equation (7) can be used to determine a feasible set of contractual parameters which
are consistent with the assumption of no-arbitrage opportunities in the market. It is
clear from the previous discussion, in fact, that the value of the contract depends on
the specification of the policy design parameters: the level of the guaranteed return,
rG, the participation coefficients, β and γ, the smoothing parameter, τ , and the term
of the contract, T . The market parameters, like the reference portfolio volatility or the
risk-free rate of interest, are also essential to complete the description of the contract;
however, they are in general not under the control of the life insurance company.
Ballotta et al. (2006.b) address in great detail the issue of a fair design of these
contracts by analyzing the feasible set of the contract parameters leading to a no-
arbitrage price, given prespecified market conditions, and the trade-offs between these
parameters. For example, they observe that the two participation parameters, β and
γ, are in general inversely proportional one to the other: a higher participation in the
annual fund performance is, in fact, compensated by a lower terminal bonus rate in
order to preserve a no-arbitrage premium (and viceversa).
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Finally, we note that from equation (7), it also follows that
VB (0)
.
= θ [Vπu (0) + γVRu (0)] = π (0) + VD (0) . (8)
Therefore, the no arbitrage price of the default option VD can be considered as the extra
“premium” that the insurer has to charge in order to offer the policyholder protection
against default, and therefore avoid arbitrage opportunities (Ballotta et al., 2006.a and
2006.b). In this respect, in the sequel we follow Ballotta et al. (2006.a) and define a
safety loading rate ϕ ∈ R++ such that VD (0) = ϕπ (0), so that
VB (0) = (1 + ϕ) π (0) , (9)
which is in the spirit of the “expected value” premium principle of actuarial theory
(Daykin et al. (1994)). In particular, Ballotta et al. (2006.a) explore the consequences
of charging this additional premium to the policyholder and investing it in the same
reference fund underlying the life insurance policy. The results of their analysis show
a significant reduction in the probability of default at maturity, even if the insurance
company is, in a sense, “passive” in terms of implementing a carefully designed hedging
strategy.
2.3 The reference portfolio
The final component of the participating policy is the reference fund, F , in which the
policyholder’s contribution is invested and used for the calculation of his/her benefit.
In the subsequent sections of this paper, we assume that F is represented by a portfolio
of equity shares, and zero coupon bonds with redemption date set equal to the maturity
of the policy. Thus, setting α ∈ [0, 1] as the percentage of equity held in the fund, and
assuming that the asset allocation is kept constant over time and rebalancing is carried
out once a year, it follows that
F (t) = αF (t− 1)
S(t)
S(t− 1)
+ (1− α)F (t− 1)
P (t, T )
P (t− 1, T )
,
where S(t) and P (t, T ) are the prices at time t respectively of the equity share and the
zero coupon bond expiring at time T .
In more detail, we consider a frictionless market, with continuous trading and per-
fectly divisible securities, in which the equity share, S, follows (under the real proba-
bility measure P) a geometric Brownian motion
dS (t) = µS (t) dt+ σS (t) dW (t) , (10)
with µ ∈ R and σ ∈ R++, and the term structure of interest rates is modeled within
a Heath-Jarrow-Morton (HJM) framework (Heath et al., 1992) with exponentially de-
caying forward rate volatility. The corresponding dynamic of the short rate, under P,
is therefore (see for example Chiarella and Kwon, 2001) given by
dr (t) = κ (a (t)− r (t)) dt+ vdZ (t) , (11)
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where
a (t) =
v2
2κ2
(
1− e−2κt
)
+
v
κ
λt,
and λ is the market price of interest rate risk. The corresponding price of a T -zero
coupon bond is
P (t, T ) =
P (0, T )
P (0, t)
e−C(t,T )−δ(t,T )(r(t)−f(0,t)), (12)
δ (t, T ) =
1− e−κ(T−t)
κ
,
C (t, T ) =
v2
4κ
δ (t, T )2
(
1− e−2κt
)
,
f (0, t) = r0e
−κt.
Finally, we assume that the stock price and the short rate of interest are correlated,
i.e. dW (t) dZ (t) = ρdt, where ρ ∈ (−1, 1) is the instantaneous correlation coefficient
between the driving Wiener processes.
3 Asset allocation strategy
In the light of the capital requirements imposed on insurance companies by regulatory
authorities following the move towards the new Solvency II regime, the pricing and
hedging of the options embedded in participating policies have become a crucial issue
for the risk management of these contracts. However, the absence of a liquid secondary
market for insurance contracts, the long maturities involved with these contracts and
the nature of the corresponding reference portfolios make it challenging to find, in
the financial market, suitable derivatives with which to match the risk profile of the
liabilities implied by participating contracts like the one described in section 2. In this
respect, however, the insurance company could implement an asset allocation strategy
for the reference portfolio which is aimed at minimizing (in some sense) the financial
risk induced by the insurance policy. Hence, in this section, we consider the problem of
choosing a (static) asset allocation strategy which “stabilizes” the expected guaranteed
benefit due at maturity, π(T ), with respect to some prespecified target and according
to a prespecified optimality criterion. We then analyze the impact of this optimal
allocation on the solvency requirements for the insurer and its behaviour when the
design parameters are changed.
Thus, in our approach, we calculate the target as the value at maturity of the
minimum guarantee (i.e. the fixed part of the benefit) increased by h% in order to
take into account the participation of the policyholder in the returns generated by the
reference fund, i.e.
t
.
= π0 (1 + rG (1 + h))
T
.
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As far as the optimality criterion is concerned, our objective is to minimize the volatil-
ity, under the real probability measure, of the guaranteed part of the benefit with
respect to the prespecified target, in order to reduce as much as possible the uncer-
tainty of the insurer’s fixed liability. In other words, we want to solve the following
minimization problem
min
α∈[0,1]
E
[
(π (T )− t)2
]1/2
. (13)
In particular, we note that
E
[
(π (T )− t)2
]
= Var [π (T )] + (E [π (T )]− t)2 .
Further, using the results obtained in section 2, the minimization problem (13) can be
formulated as
min
α∈[0,1]
E
[
(π (T )− t)2
]1/2
= θ min
α∈[0,1]
[
Var [πu (T )] + (E [πu (T )]− tu)2
]1/2
. (14)
The previous equation shows, on the one hand, that the optimum value α∗ does not
depend on the financial leverage θ; on the other hand, the optimal allocation strategy
attempts to reduce both the volatility of the guaranteed benefit, π, and the options
embedded therein, and the distance of the expected guaranteed benefit from the chosen
target.
Because of the absence of analytical formulae for both the price of the contract
and the objective function, our analysis is based on Monte Carlo simulation and is
organized as follows. Given an initial set of parameters, we firstly solve numerically
the optimization problem (13) in order to obtain the asset allocation related to the
prespecified contract. Secondly, we calculate the corresponding no-arbitrage values of
the life insurance policy and the related embedded options using the results obtained in
section 2. Finally, we analyze the impact of the optimal asset allocation on the default
probability of the insurance company both at maturity and 1 year after the inception
of the contract, i.e.
P (π(T ) > A(T )) and P (π(1) > A(1)) ,
where A represents the total assets available to the insurer and such that A(0) = F (0)+
VD(0). For this part of the analysis, we need to specify a suitable investment strategy
for the safety loading VD(0) as well. In the literature, this particular problem has been
explored in some detail by Bernard et al. (2006) who consider three alternatives for the
construction of protection against the risk of default: (a) investing the safety loading
in the same fund backing the liability, (b) the purchase of an equity default swap, (c)
the partial sale of the default put back to the policyholder. The results of their analysis
show that the proposed investment strategies return similar level of protection in the
case of low volatility, whilst the equity default swap proves to be the best option in
case the of high volatility.
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Market model
Equity µ = 10% p.a. σ = 20% p.a.
Interest rate r0 = 4.5% v = 0.2942% κ = 0.9866%
λ = −0.015 ρ = −0.2
Policy design
β = 70% θ = 90% rG = 4% h = 70%
F (0) = 100 τ = 3 years T = 20 years
Table 1: Parameter set for the numerical example implemented in section 4.
In this paper, we adopt a different approach, in that we assume that the full safety
loading is charged to the policyholder; further, we assume that the insurance com-
pany invests this premium either in the fixed income market to purchase an equivalent
amount of zero coupon bonds with maturity at the expiration of the policy, or in the
equity market. The third alternative that we consider is the same as strategy (a) pro-
posed by Bernard et al. (2006), which also corresponds to the “passive” investment
strategy discussed in Ballotta et al. (2006.a).
We further extend the analysis to the insurer’s capital requirements as well, by
calculating the solvency target capital. In particular, we follow Ballotta (2009) and
calculate a suitable risk measure, such as Value at Risk (VaR) and Tail Value at Risk
(TVaR), over a 1-year time horizon (CEIOPS, 2006) of the solvency index
s(t) =
R˜BC(t+ 1)− RBC(t)
A(t)
,
where RBC(t) denotes the Risk Bearing Capital (RBC) at time t ∈ [0, T ] (FOPI,
2004), and R˜BC denotes its value discounted at the risk free rate. The RBC is defined
as the difference between the total value of the company’s assets, including the safety
loading, and the market consistent price of the liabilities, i.e.
RBC(t) = A(t)− Vπ(t)− γVR(t).
Discounting at the risk free rate is applied in order to reflect the implicit assumption
that the target capital should represent the amount that, once invested in the money
market account, guarantees an appropriate protection to the policyholders as well as
the stability of the company with a certain confidence level.
4 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results obtained from the numerical ex-
periments described above. In particular, unless otherwise stated, we use the model
parameters reported in Table 1. Hence, we analyze the case in which the policyholders
11
β α∗ Vπ (0) VR (0) VD (0) γ % ϕ %
0.3 1 68.6183 35.8058 13.1643 96.48 14.63
0.4 0.8924 75.1433 29.0018 12.4418 94.13 13.82
0.5 0.6563 76.6864 22.1740 7.0943 92.04 7.88
0.6 0.4835 78.4642 16.9290 3.6285 89.57 4.03
0.7 0.3448 80.7334 12.3448 1.5056 87.26 1.67
0.8 0.2222 84.0793 7.7263 0.4614 82.60 0.51
0.9 0.1114 89.6243 2.7147 0.2836 24.28 0.32
Table 2: Market consistent price of the options embedded in the participating contract for
the optimal asset allocation α∗ corresponding to different levels of the participation rate β.
The table also reports the “fair” value of the terminal bonus rate γ, which is obtained as the
solution to Equation (7) and the safety loading rate as defined in Equation (9). Estimation
based on 100,000 simulations with variance reduction techniques.
Investment P (π (T ) > A (T )) % P (π (1) > A (1)) %
strategy a) VD (0) only b) A (0) VD (0) only
β α∗ α = 0 α∗ α = 1 α = 0 α∗ α = 1 α = 0 α∗ α = 1
0.3 1 12.49 15.15 15.15 0.00 15.15 15.15 0.02 0.15 0.17
0.4 0.8924 12.38 14.78 15.04 0.00 14.78 18.52 0.04 0.26 0.28
0.5 0.6563 8.69 10.13 10.80 0.00 10.13 21.11 0.02 0.04 0.07
0.6 0.4835 5.97 6.46 7.08 0.00 6.46 28.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.7 0.3448 3.58 3.78 4.00 0.00 3.78 30.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.8 0.2222 1.93 1.98 2.08 0.01 1.98 43.11 0.01 0.02 0.02
0.9 0.1114 2.98 3.10 3.10 3.35 3.10 36.81 0.53 0.54 0.49
Table 3: Probability of default at maturity and in one year from the contract’s inception for
different levels of the participation rate β. For the case of default at maturity, we consider
both the cases in which a) the insurance company invests the reference portfolio according
to the optimal strategy α∗, whilst the premium of the default option is invested either in
bonds, in the optimal portfolio or in equity only; b) the overall company’s assets are invested
according to the (α = 0, α∗, α = 1) strategies. For the 1-year probability, we consider only
case (a). Estimation based on 100,000 simulations.
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Figure 1: The optimal asset allocation for different values of the participation rate β (panel
a), the minimum guarantee rG (panel b) and the target parameter h (panel c). The Monte
Carlo estimate of the objective function is based on 100,000 simulations. The optimization
routine makes use of the Brent algorithm (see, for example, Press et al. (1997)).
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contribute 90% of the initial value of the reference portfolio to enter a participating con-
tract offering a 4% minimum guarantee and a 70% participation rate in the smoothed
returns generated by the portfolio. Smoothing is operated on a 3-year time scale and
the contract has a life span of 20 years. We also assume a 20% p.a. volatility for the
equity investment with 10% expected return; further, the short interest rate is fixed at
4.5% whilst the parameters of the interest rate model are calibrated on the basis of a
6% p.a. 20 year yield to maturity and a 5.34% p.a. volatility on a 20-year zero coupon
bond.
Figure 1 shows the optimal asset allocation for several combinations of the partic-
ipation rate, β, the target, h, and the minimum guarantee, rG. In Table 2, we report
the corresponding market consistent values of the options embedded in the insurance
policy, together with the value of the terminal bonus rate which guarantees the fairness
of the contract according to the equilibrium condition given by Equation (7) and the
size of the safety loading rate given by Equation (9).
The results from the numerical analysis show that the optimal asset allocation
is a decreasing function of the participation rate, and an increasing function of the
target parameter h and the minimum guarantee. This is consistent with intuition:
ceteris paribus, a higher participation rate in the fund’s returns makes the target
easier to reach; therefore, the insurer can switch asset allocation by investing more
in the less risky asset. On the other hand, the insurer will have to adopt a more
aggressive investment strategy if the target becomes more demanding, due to either
higher policyholder participation or a higher minimum guarantee.
Further, the fair values reported in Table 2 for the embedded options show that the
value of the guaranteed benefit is increasing in β, irrespective of the composition of
the reference fund. This is consistent with Equation (2): the level of the policyholder
participation in the fund’s returns is in fact the “spot price” of the underlying asset on
which the embedded Asian option is written. The effect of the change in the portfolio
mix is instead “averaged” by the smoothing mechanism in place. As far as the terminal
bonus and the default option are concerned, we note that their price is a decreasing
function of β. In the case of the terminal bonus, these findings are consistent with
what has been observed previously by, for example, Ballotta et al. (2006.b); further,
we note that for β = 70% the proposed asset allocation strategy leads to a terminal
bonus rate γ = 87.26% which is lower than the γ = 100% which we would obtain
from a bond-only reference portfolio, but higher than the γ = 30.18% originating
from an investment in a equity-only reference fund. The case of the default option
instead seems anomalous with respect to the existing literature. However, we note
that the default option is essentially a put option on the company’s assets with a path-
dependent strike price. As the option price is an increasing function of the underlying’s
volatility, the observed pattern is justified by the fact that by reducing α, i.e. the equity
component in the portfolio, the fund’s overall volatility reduces as well. Hence, we note
that the asset allocation operating on the reference portfolio reduces considerably the
size of the safety loading compared to the initial company’s fund: the safety loading
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corresponding to the (α = 100%, β = 70%) combination is, in fact, 53.79%, whilst for
the (α∗ = 34.48%, β = 70%) case, it is 1.67%.
The probability of default at maturity which is generated by the optimal asset
allocation is shown in Table 3 and in Figure 2 for several values of the participation
rate β. Specifically, in panel (a) of Figure 2 we show the default probabilities for the case
in which the reference fund F is invested according to the optimal strategy α∗, while
the safety loading is invested respectively in bonds (α = 0), according to the strategy
α∗, or in equities (α = 1). In panel (b), instead, we consider an identical investment
strategy for both the reference fund and the safety loading, and we compare the default
probabilities generated by the optimal asset allocation with the bond-only and equities-
only investment strategies. Table 3 and Figure 2 also report the probabilities of default
1 year after the inception of the contract corresponding to the investment strategies
considered in panel (a).
For each row in Table 3 - panels (a) and (b), corresponding to a fixed value of β, we
note that the probability of default increases as we move from a bond only investment
strategy to an optimal investment strategy and then to an equities only investment
strategy. This increase is relatively small in panel (a), i.e. when the reference fund is
invested optimally, compared to the change observed in panel (b). Hence, this analysis
of the default probability at maturity shows the importance of investing the reference
fund optimally, especially because of the relatively small size of the safety loading (as
observed in Table 2). This is indicated by the much higher default probabilities shown
in the third column in Table 3 for each of panels (a) and (b). For instance, the default
probability at maturity corresponding to a participation rate β = 80% is 2.08% for the
case in which the fund is invested optimally and the safety loading is used to purchase
additional equities (Figure 2.a), whilst it rises to above 43% in the case in which the
total available assets are invested in the equity market (Figure 2.b).
This result contrasts, in a way, with the findings of Ballotta et al. (2006.a), in
which the safety loading plays a significant role in reducing the probability of default.
We note, however, that in their case the participating contract design is quite simple
and does not incorporate smoothing, which means that the full annual return (and
volatility) of the reference fund is transferred to the embedded option. Further, they
do not apply any diversification and use an equity-only portfolio. Finally, we observe
that the 1 year default probability for the case considered in Figure 2.a with β = 80%
is 0.02% as reported in Table 3, which is within the limits suggested by the Solvency
II review.
Figure 2 (and Tables 3) also shows a U -shaped pattern for these default probabil-
ities, suggesting the existence of a value of the participation rate β which is optimal
overall, in the sense that it minimizes both the 1 year probability of default and the
corresponding probability at maturity. This optimal value lies between 60% and 80%.
Finally, we note that the bond-only strategy leads to the lowest default probabilities,
independent of the chosen participation rate. However, as we could anticipate, Figure
3 shows that the bond-only strategy also offers the policyholder the smallest expected
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benefit at maturity; further, this expected benefit approaches the pre-specified target
only for the case of β = 100%. The optimal investment strategy, instead, provides on
average a higher and more stable benefit at maturity.
Figure 4 reports the TVaR of the solvency index s(t) defined in section 3 over the
1-year period after the start of the contract. Also in this analysis, we consider the case
in which the reference fund is invested optimally, whilst the safety loading is used to
purchase more bonds or equities, or an additional share of the same asset mix defining
the underlying portfolio. The panels in Figure 4 show that for low values of β, the
equities-only strategy generates the highest TVaR (for the case in which β = 0.3, the
TVaR is actually the same for both the optimal and the equity-only strategy), whilst
the bond-only strategy tends to produce the highest TVaR as β increases. This is
due to the fact that the reference portfolio is invested optimally, and α∗ decreases as
the participation rate increases, i.e. bonds become the predominant component and
therefore the main source of risk. The analysis of the reported target capital, however,
confirms the results shown above for the default probability. Thus, for a participation
rate of β = 70%, the three investment strategies return a target capital which is
very similar and in any case the lowest across the possible values of β that have been
explored. The expected severity, in fact, lies between 8% and 9% (depending on how
the safety loading is invested) at the AAA confidence level, and 7%-7.5% at the BBB
confidence level. For β = 50%, instead, the expected severity rises to 15%-18% at the
AAA confidence level, and 12%-15% at the BBB confidence level. In the case in which
β = 90%, the expected severity varies between 20%-21% and 14%-15% for the AAA
and BBB confidence levels respectively. Analogous conclusions can be reached when
other risk measures are used, such as the Value at Risk or the Tail Conditional Median,
as illustrated in Figure 5.
5 Stress testing
In order to assess the robustness of the asset allocation proposed in this paper, we test
the impact of an adverse (and extreme) movement in some of the fundamentals of the
financial market, such as the equity volatility or the risk free rate of interest, occurring
one year after the sale of the participating contract.
In particular, we consider the two cases in which, at time t = 1, there is (a) a 10%
increase in the volatility σ to 30% (with respect to the benchmark value given in Table
1), and (b) a 1% cut in the rate of interest prevailing in the market at time t = 1. The
resulting default probabilities are presented in Table 4 and Figure 6, in which they
are compared with the “base case scenario” that has been discussed in section 4; the
corresponding TV aR(s(1)) is shown in Figure 7.
Having seen in section 4 that this is the most appropriate course of action, we
consider only the case in which the reference fund is invested optimally, and hence
we analyze the impact of the investment strategy for the safety loading. This justi-
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Investment P (π (1) > A (1)) %
strategy a) ∆σ = +10% b) ∆r (1) = −1%
β α∗ α = 0 α∗ α = 1 α = 0 α∗ α = 1
0.3 1 0.42 1.21 1.17 0.80 1.74 1.75
0.5 0.6563 1.44 1.90 2.44 1.69 2.22 2.76
0.7 0.3448 0.17 0.19 0.25 3.67 3.87 4.17
0.9 0.1114 1.25 1.20 1.19 99.92 99.92 99.90
Table 4: Stress testing: 1-year probability of default originated by a) a 10% increase in the
equity volatility, and b) a 1% reduction in the interest rate. Both shocks are assumed to
occur at the beginning of year 1. Estimation based on 100,000 simulations
fies the trend in the RBC shown in Figure 7. The RBC seems, in fact, quite stable
across the three investment strategies. Thus, the same shock (i.e. either the change
in the volatility or the interest rate cut) produces the same change in the expected
severity irrespective of the investment strategy adopted for the safety loading, which
is consistent with its relatively small size. Further, the volatility shock has a bigger
impact on TV aR(s(1)) for low values of the participation rate β, but this reduces as β
increases; the impact generated by the interest rate shock has an opposite effect. This
is consistent with the change in the composition of the reference portfolio from equities
to bonds which occurs for increasing values of β.
Similar considerations apply to the 1-year default probability reported in Table
4 and Figure 6. The probability of default increases as a result of the shocks; the
impact of the interest rate cut, in particular, is predominant for higher values of β.
For β = 90%, in fact, the bond component in the reference portfolio is 88.86% whilst
the safety loading is 0.32% of the initial capital. This leads to a 99.92% probability
of experiencing a loss of 48% of the initial capital at the AAA confidence level, and a
loss between 36%-40% at the BB/BBB confidence levels. The volatility shock, instead,
only generates an expected loss of 23% of the initial capital at the AAA confidence
level with probability 1.19% (the corresponding loss at the BB/BBB level is between
14% and 17%). These results are independent of the investment strategy applied to
the safety loading.
Thus, this experiment shows that if diversification is applied, i.e. a suitable asset
allocation is performed on the reference portfolio, the magnitude of the safety loading
is contained and therefore how it is actually used for hedging purposes becomes of
less relevance. The analysis carried out also confirms the result obtained for the base
case scenario discussed in section 4, that a value of the participation rate β in the
region of 70% is optimal overall. In this case, which corresponds to a portfolio mix
34.48% equity - 65.52% bonds and a 1.67% safety loading, a 10% increase in the equity
volatility produces an expected loss of 19% at the AAA confidence level (or between
14% and 15% at the BB/BBB confidence level) with probability 0.19%. A 1% cut in
the interest rate, instead, leads to a 29% expected loss at the AAA confidence level (or
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20%-22% loss at the BB/BBB confidence level) with probability 3.87%.
6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper consists in the development of a suitable asset
allocation strategy aimed at the risk management of the most common type of partici-
pating life insurance sold across Europe and the UK, and Japan. The choice of strategy
is based on minimizing the risk induced by the policy, as measured by the mean squared
departure of the guaranteed benefit at maturity relative to a pre-specified target. We
also investigate the impact of this investment strategy on the capital requirements of
the insurance company by means of indices such as the probability of default, and VaR
and TVaR risk measures based on the Risk Bearing Capital. The analysis is based on
a market consistent pricing methodology.
The principal numerical results show that the optimal asset allocation generates a
probability of default over a 1 year time horizon that is consistent with the regulatory
requirements imposed by the Solvency II regime. Further, because the default option
premium is quite small, the asset allocation strategy applied to this premium plays
a minor role as far as risk management is concerned. The results also indicate the
existence of an optimal choice for the design parameter β, representing the participation
rate, which minimizes the overall default risk of the insurance company.
The stress testing exercise investigates the impact of an increase in the equity
market volatility or a decrease in the short rate of interest 1 year into the contract’s
lifetime, when the optimal asset allocation strategy is deployed. The effect of these
shocks depends on the contract design and the optimal choice for the asset allocation -
with a high equities content, the portfolio is sensitive to changes in the equity volatility.
With a high bond content, the portfolio is extremely sensitive to reductions in the
interest rate as measured by the 1 year probability of default and other risk measures.
However, the optimal choice for the participation rate β detected in the base case
scenario still proves optimal in terms of minimization of the overall default risk.
As noted in the earlier sections, the model does not take account of mortality risk.
In normal circumstances, the life insurance benefit would be paid to the policyholders
providing that they survive until maturity, T , and there might be a payment on earlier
death. We, instead, assume that policyholders will survive to time T with probability
1; this choice is partly justified by the term of the contract considered in this paper,
as mortality effects generally play a more important role over longer time horizons.
Similarly, we also ignore the policyholder’s option to surrender the policy. This would
give the policyholder the possibility to cancel the policy before time T , if this seemed
desirable. This additional “American-option” feature would make the contract more
valuable to the policyholder. In order to compensate for this increase in value, it is
common for insurance companies to impose a penalty charge if the policyholder opts
to surrender the policy before time T . Both of these features represent possibilities for
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inclusion in the analysis and hence for future work.
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Figure 3: Expected value of the guaranteed benefit at maturity generated by the
(α = 0, α∗, α = 1) possible investment strategies. In the plot these expected values are com-
pared against the prespecified target t = π0 (1 + rG (1 + h))
T calculated in accordance with
the base parameter set reported in Table 1. Estimation based on 100,000 Monte Carlo sim-
ulation.
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Figure 4: Risk Bearing Capital for the participating contract described in section 2 as
measured by TV aR(s(1)). The reference fund is invested optimally, whilst the safety loading
is invested according to the (α = 0, α∗, α = 1) investment strategies. The confidence levels
are fixed on the basis of the Standard & Poor’s classification (AAA = 99.99%; AA = 99.97%;
A = 99.93%; BBB = 99.77%; BB = 99.31%; B = 93.46%). Estimation based on 100,000
simulations for the benchmark set of parameters given in Table 1.
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fidence level. The reference fund is invested optimally, whilst the safety loading is invested
according to the (α = 0, α∗, α = 1) investment strategies. Estimation based on 100,000 sim-
ulations for the benchmark set of parameters given in Table 1.
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Figure 6: Stress testing: the 1-year default probabilities reported in Table 4 are compared
against the corresponding 1-year probabilities for the base case scenario (Table 3).
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